of the global North, the deconstruction of the welfare state and related individualisation, the expansion of the digital economy, and the new media revolution (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1991) . The internet's many and varied technologies -Google, eBay, email, social networking sites such as Facebook and Bebo, e-dating sites -figure in accounts of such changes, on occasion as undermining of self and social relations (Bauman, 2003; Sennett, 1998) , and at other times as forces for good (Turkle 1997 (Turkle [1995 ). Others have criticised these pessimistic and hopeful viewpoints, pointing to their universalising and totalising qualities and showing how, together, they form a dualistic transformation narrative regarding social change and the internet (Mosco, 2004; Woolgar, 2002) . For example, a television news story from 2009 concerned itself with the ways in which Facebook was seen to contribute to the disruption of family life (World News Australia (SBS Television), 2009). Another news item from that year revealed how people in Iran were using Twitter and other online media to circulate otherwise prohibited texts and images of public protest (ABC News Victoria [ABC Television Melbourne], 2009). The Facebook news story conveyed the pessimistic view that the internet harms family life. The Twitter news story expressed hope for the internet's emancipatory power. Of course, it may be possible to accept both such accounts of the internet's effects. What connects them, however, is the transformation narrative of the internet -society relation, of which pessimism and hope are among its repertoire of expressions.
This transformation story, whether in its pessimistic or hopeful form, raises questions for theories of social change and the internet. The news stories I noted above draw on technological determinism to give the internet undue power over social existence, glossing over the contingent historical and social qualities of its technologies. At the same time however, it would be mistaken to say that internet technologies simply mediate historical and social forces. This would be to adopt cultural determinism and to ignore the ways in which internet technologies do have material presences and social effects. In an elegant engagement with this problem, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim suggest that technologies are both 'cause and effect ' of society (2002) . This view draws on Heidegger's notion that technology and society are the conditions of possibility for each other (1977b) . This perspective implies that the Facebook practices of teenagers do instantiate the transformation of family life, but not outside historical and social contingency. Likewise, Twitter does appear to be used to call into existence a form of social protest that is at once a matter of its technical capacities and historical circumstances. The focus for critical inquiry becomes not what technologies do to, or for, society, but rather, the particular ways in which social and technological possibilities constitute one another. In a similar line of argument, Donna Haraway asserts that: 'It is not clear who makes and who is made in the relation between human and machine ' (1991: 178) , suggesting that the productive ambiguity of the internet -society relation raises questions of who we are and can become. Such questions of subjectivity are not only philosophical; they also concern difference and power. For example, feminists have focused on the gendering of access to, and authority over, technologies, including those of the internet (Henwood et al., 2001 ). Health care is also implicated in this debate, as patient websites and informatics, along with many other biomedical technologies, come into focus as the means for regulating biomedicine's subjects (Webster, 2007) .
Such questions of subjectivity after the internet have led researchers to experience-oriented narrative inquiry (Bakardjieva, 2005) and 'technobiography', that is, autobiographical writing on life experience with technologies (Henwood et al., 2001) . Such approaches supply nuanced accounts of gendered subjects shaping and being shaped by the technologies of everyday life. These uses of narrative echo Sherry Turkle's seminal Life on the screen (1997 [1995] ). Turkle's psychosocial exploration of internet lives mixed autobiographical reflections, stories of her encounters with research participants, and their own stories. One of Turkle's key concepts was the idea of the 'protean' self of online existence; the idea that being online throws up choices with regard to the identities and social relations that can take shape online, including reflexive engagement with gender, sexuality and embodiment. A central concern in this narrative-oriented research is that everyday life with internet technologies has been given too little attention in academic inquiry, which on the whole is distracted by the spectacular and satisfies itself with polemic. As Henwood et al. and others argue, it is necessary to give attention to how lives are experienced as the basis for confirming or refuting prevailing assumptions regarding life with the internet.
Narrative, then, provides a useful way of researching the internet -society relation. It establishes the means for examining the storied character of the notion that the internet is implicated in social change. The transformation narrative I have mentioned, in either its pessimistic or hopeful expression, can be examined as an object of research itself, for instance, as it appears in interviews with internet users. Narrative inquiry also makes it possible to assume a relation between the narratives of interviewees and their experiences of life with the internet, but in a way that recognises that this relation is a complex, provisional one, since many factors mediate the production and circulation of life stories. Such provisionalities include pre-existing conventions and practices of narration and complex relations between language and human action (Ricoeur, 1984) . This approach permits the researcher to develop insights with regard to lived experience, without omitting the critical perspectives that come from reflexivity with narrative inquiry. In addition, narrative inquiry does not only concern itself with the content of stories. It also addresses how people tell stories, under what circumstances, and who is ready to interpret them. In this view, the focus of research is on a 'narrative economy' of more or less valued stories, story-tellers and audiences. Key here are the historical and social circumstances of which stories are told and when, as in the case of the coming out stories of gay men and more latterly, sexual abuse stories (Plummer, 1995) . For internet research, the focus becomes what kinds of stories get to be told and what these suggest about the sanctioning and foreclosure of online selves and social relations.
However, a narrative approach also supplies the basis for a more searching analysis of the internet -society relation and, in particular, its ramifications for subjectivity. Telling one's story implies that the narrator takes on the assumption that they have their own story to tell and therefore the notion of themselves as a subject of narrative, or crudely put, that they take on the reflexive 'I'; the first-person, singular pronoun that permits narrators to address themselves in their stories. Such narrative subjectification can be seen in how internet users position themselves in their stories as subject to internet-related effects. Further, if it can be assumed that storytelling implies reflexivity with narrative meanings, it can also be assumed that story-tellers can call into question such meanings, with implications for the ontological status of self. As Judith Butler put it in Giving an account of oneself: '. . . if I question the regime of truth, I question too, the regime through which being, and my own ontological status, is allocated. ' (2005: 23 ). Butler's notion of ontological trouble is distinct from that which figures in theories of reflexive modernisation (Giddens, 1991) . There, ontology has to do with trust relations and abstract systems of knowledge and expertise. Nor is the ontology at stake for Butler the same as that implied by Walkerdine's beingness, which takes an interest in emotions and other psychosocial experiences. Butler's view of self concerns the performative in story-telling and, relatedly, the narrator's reflexivity with the meanings they employ to convey their story. But these perspectives do share skepticism with regard to any notion of a unitary, originary self, preferring instead to see it as historically, socially and, in Butler's case, performatively, contingent. Narrative performativity therefore helps draw attention to points of continuity and separation with regard to different perspectives on the ontological status of self, nuances I take to be salient for this research on internet-related experiences.
Further, if double reflexivity with narrative meanings trouble selves and social relations, what then of internet technologies? What ontological status do they have and how do they relate to narrative? Internet technologies may not simply influence one's biography or mediate one's story-telling; they may help to make one's life story in ways not otherwise possible. As Haraway (1991) pointed out, and as others have discussed (Henwood et al., 2001) , it is not important to find or reassert the boundaries of human/machine or other so-called oppositions, such as material/imagined, mind/body and, in the present case, narrative/internet technologies. As will be suggested in what follows, the beingness of internet-technologies, at times and in particular circumstances, is narratively organised. An added complication is that internet-technologies are employed by internet users to act on themselves and their social experience. Thus, internetusers are of the world they seek to make. Somewhat departing from Butler, Karen Barad argued that: 'We do not obtain knowledge by standing outside of the world; we know because "we" are of the world. We are part of the world in its differential becoming ' (2003: 829) . In this view, internet users' narratives of their experience depend on the selves and social relations they help to make through internet technologies. Note also Barad's reference to 'world' here to engage with the ontology of the human -technology relation, a usage that suggests Heidegger's notion of 'world picture ' (1977a) . Taking the position that '"world" serves . . . as a name for what is ' (1977a: 129) , Heidegger remarks on the ways in which science and technology of the modern age are implicated in a historically contingent understanding of world beingness and the human subject. I take up these problematics regarding the ontological status of the narrative -internet technologies relation in the discussion to follow.
In this paper therefore, I examine interview talk regarding experiences of internet-related transitions, through a narrative approach oriented to: stories of the internet; story-telling regarding experience of internet technologies in everyday life; and of the 'You have to come into the world' relation between narrative practices and internet technologies. The argument sustained here, therefore, moves between accounts of lived experience and theoretical and analytical perspectives concerning social transformation and internet technologies, with the aim of exploring, in a nuanced manner, how internet users negotiate the social worlds coming into being after the internet.
Research approach
The narratives analysed for this paper derive from interviews with internet users where they were asked to recount and reflect on their life histories with regard to internet-related technologies. The interviewees were recruited by snowballing in the social networks of the author and a colleague who conducted several of the interviews. Volunteers were selected according to purposive criteria of gender parity, a spread of ages, and diversity in life experience with the internet. Six men and nine women were interviewed. They ranged in age from 19 to 65 years. Roughly half the group finished schooling prior to the establishment of the internet as a commercially available communication technology in the mid 1990s. They were ethnically diverse and five had experience of migration to Australia. Most had some form of tertiary education (either directly after schooling or later in life) and were working (or searching for work) in white-collar occupations. The interviews were conducted one-to-one and face-toface (apart from one online and one couple interview). Ethical approval for the research was granted by the Human Research Ethics Committee at Monash University.
Interviewees were asked to talk about their family background, education, work experience and family life with reference to internet technologies, including: personal computers, including their early and later incarnations; browsing and searching technology; email; and social networking websites. Interviewees were asked to explore key events such as their first experiences with these technologies, changes in their practices, the biographical, social and interpersonal contexts of these practices and to reflect on their experiences. Key events and themes of internet-related social change were identified for each interviewee's narrative. These were then compared and contrasted to develop the analysis presented here.
It is important to note that interviewees reported that they engaged with internet technologies in the manner of a smorgasbord, often combining them in creative ways in their daily life. For example, Harriet, who had recently migrated to Australia, Somatechnics spoke of using web technologies to organise a form of mediated babysitting:
We were in [Italy] in August, and I installed Skype onto my parents computer, and I told them that we can do that and it makes life much easier because I felt a bit detached from them . . . Because we speak on the phone twice a week before we used to do this video conferencing, and because I have a baby now, it's much easier for them to see him. My Mum even does babysitting! When I have a shower she baby-sits him. I attach the computer to the speakers and if he does anything she just calls me and I come out. (Harriet, 36) Harriet's baby-sitting story underlines her inventive bricolage of online life. Other interviewees' examples included: establishing a gay men's support group in a working-class part of the city; ecological activism; searching for family history and lost relatives; pursuing specialist music and clothing not broadcast or sold in Australia; working on self-development; saving money, and the list goes on. The following assumes that the use of internet technologies is profitably understood from the viewpoint of inventive bricolage. It is common in internet research to work from technology out, that is, to select a website or internet function and build up a detailed picture of online practices, as I have previously done in relation to gay men's use of internet dating sites (Davis, 2009) . While providing rich detail, research in this mode does not tell us much about the creative ways in which users engage and combine different internet technologies. Indeed, without this wider point of view, social science accounts are led to a form of technological determinism where life with the internet is reified through the lens of specific technologies. Such undesirable effects are one reason why researchers argue for the analysis of experience-oriented narratives regarding everyday life with the internet as an important adjunct, or even corrective, for social inquiry that overdetermines the effects of one feature of the internet or another (Bakardjieva, 2005; Henwood et al., 2001 ). In addition, internet (and other communication) technologies such as mobile telephony (and other communication devices) are increasingly integrated with the internet, making technologicallyspecific forms of analysis seem nonsensically arbitrary. Indeed, interviewees made reference to other technologies such as mobile phones, palm pilots, televisions and cameras in their accounts of internet-related life experiences. For these reasons, the analysis presented here explores accounts of internet technologies and related technologies, in general and through specific examples, as 'You have to come into the world' the basis for making claims regarding their relation with lived experience.
In the next sections, I discuss how internet-related transitions were at times marked by a language of emotions and connected with interviewee concerns of 'being-in-the-world'. I then take these perspectives further to consider how, in some instances, internet technologies appear to take the form of narrative.
Being-in-the-world and the language of emotional transition
Interviewees recognised that taking up internet technologies was beneficial, even necessary, but also questioned what these technologies meant for themselves and their relations with others. More than a few of the interviewees spoke of such questions through imaginaries of changing social worlds inflected with the language of emotional transition.
In her interview, Ellen spoke of internet-related change as a shift from negative to positive emotion and connected this change with a particular take on social worlds: I was pretty distressed by modern technology. I remember I didn't have a mobile phone for a very long time. I resisted it. And my partner bought me one and said 'You have to come into the world.'
[later] There was a little bit of fear, like with my mobile phone. I was anxious with it in the beginning . . . I couldn't send a text. I felt like an idiot. It all ties back to being a kid and feeling like an idiot I think. You know. I just didn't want to. I was scared that I wouldn't be able to do it . . . it was just learning something new freaked me out . . . and I was a bit reluctant in the beginning 'cause I didn't like the idea of computers in the world and stuff. (Ellen, 50 years) Ellen used the example of the mobile phone to signal anxiety related to taking up 'modern technology' including computers and the internet. Her anxiety is sourced in her own history as a learner, but also associated with reluctance for what appears to be the overtechnologisation of the social. Other parts of Ellen's interview made use of 'freaked me out', 'scary' and 'reluctant'. In this Ellen took up the pessimistic turn in the transformation story of the internet. But when talking about the present internet, the emotional language had changed: 'I love it, I love it, I love it. I spend so much time on it . . . yeah. The fear's gone. I mean I . . . I'm not scared of it now'. The anxiety provoking anticipation of the challenges associated with going online appeared to have been overcome. In another, less dramatic, transition, Jane spoke of how technology can itself solve some of the challenges of going online:
Jane: I'm not all that familiar or comfortable with anything new on the internet so I find it quite intimidating. I:
In Until you got your Mac? Jane: Until I got my Mac. I feel a lot more free to use it. I'm using it a lot more since I had that. I've only had it for a couple of years, but I really do think that one of my main reasons is that I had a perception that you'd get into trouble with it. (Jane, 53)
Both Ellen and Jane suggested that going online meant they had to confront their lack of knowledge and experience. Ellen's method of figuring emotional transition suggested pessimism (anxiety) and hope (love). There is a sense, then, that the language of emotional transition maps onto the duality of pessimism and hope found in the internettransformation story. Ellen's and, to some extent, Jane's accounts can also be read to suggest that making a transition to love is recognised as a way of coping with, or mending, the troubles for self that the internet presents. In her exploration of affect and performativity, Eve KosofskySedgwick has pointed out the reparative value of love (2003) . Among its values, love helps transcend negative emotions and experiences. In this view, Ellen's use of the language of love is her way of securing a viable relation with the changes associated with taking up internet technologies.
Because Ellen and Jane were adults when the internet became widely available, their accounts do suggest the common idea that older people have more difficulty going online than do younger people, such as the so-called 'digital natives', who are said to have no such struggles (Palfrey & Gasser, 2008) . However, not all the older people among the interviewees expressed such misgivings. For example, Colin, 65 at time of the interview, had been keen on computers and internet technologies right from the start, so it seems, and was an adult when each of these became available. Colin described how he used a crude form of the internet as early as 1987 and experimented with the precursor forms of GUIs. His story stood nicely in opposition to notions of younger people as the only kind of online citizens with a prevailing facility with internet technologies.
'You have to come into the world'
What stood out in the extract from Ellen's interview, however, was her use of 'you have to come into the world'. This phrase implied that whether or not one wants to take up internet technologies, mobile phones and other communication devices, to be in the world requires that one does so. The phrase connoted a mixture of invitation and instruction to step into a changing world, since it was figured as reported speech on the part of Ellen's partner. In addition, 'you have to come into the world' comprised a strong, perhaps inescapable, injunction. The phrase is also 'performative' (Butler, 2005) in the sense that it expresses what one has to do to be. This emphatic use of 'world' also resonates with Barad's knowing through being (2003), and Heidegger's world '. . . as a name for what is' and therefore the relation that the human subject can imaginatively establish with beingness (Heidegger, 1977a) . Implied here then is a changed sense of the being-in-the-world associated with taking up internet technologies and related communication devices.
Other interviewees, whether perturbed by life after the internet or not, shared in the use of 'world'. Examples included: how the world is smaller after the internet ('. . . the spread of information and the fact that it has made the world smaller is a good thing', Andrew, 32); the internet gives access to the world ('I usually will log on, have a look at what's happening in the world', Diana, 29); and a sense of how social isolation is also possible ('. . . just to get out in the world, because you can be in an incredible world of your own with this technology', Fay, 55). In her interview, Kate spoke of using the internet to sustain international social connections and referred to the shrinking of the globe and the privatising of social life that the internet is said to make possible, therefore bringing together the contradictory quality of the previous comments:
My one girlfriend in [France], she was having a really hard time. 'Cause she and her husband had just, they'd tried to move to the [US], and it hadn't worked out, so they'd just come back. I think it pretty much coincided -they came back -and then I left -they went back to [France] and then I left Australia. And then my girlfriend was just so terribly depressed . . . So, you know, we had some short emails back and forth. But both of us were just sort of huddled in our own little worlds. (Kate, 32) Such world discourse assisted interviewees to give voice to the proportions of what they estimated was possible and happening in connection with the internet. World also connotes a relation between world and self; a relation of large to small, of society and the personal.
Somatechnics
World is also a common feature of discourse on the internet. For example, the internet is sometimes called the 'world-wide-web', there are 'virtual worlds', and online games ask players to navigate and even create 'worlds'. In addition to its other connotations, perhaps 'world' is also metonymic for the internet itself. On the basis of these meanings of world, it can be surmised that such discourse does reflect an engagement with the changed conditions of beingness associated with internet technologies.
Following Butler and Walkerdine, however, the social imaginaries of changing internet-mediated worlds connoted an unsettled beingness. This unsettling was most obvious when interviewees spoke of their reservations concerning social experience after the internet. As noted above, Ellen figured transition with the language of distress morphing into love. But Ellen also reported a discomforting dependency: 'I've got a thing now about my technology . . . I feel a bit disconnected if I can't get to it', showing how one can have a positive attitude towards technologies but still have a qualified engagement with them. In this more pessimistic mode, Diana recognised troubles for the fabric of culture:
But it seems like so much of their social world is done on the internet and also mobile phones I think as well, a lot. And so I think that, as much as that can be a good thing in that they're keeping in touch with people etcetera, even just grammar, spelling all those old school things that just go out the window with emails and texts and stuff. I'm a bit old school about that. (Diana, 29) In a more sociological line of critique, Fay spoke of potential for social inequality:
I think that new technology is going to widen the gap between the haves and have-nots, I think it really will. It'll marginalise, I don't know the bottom however you would say 10% or whatever, it will. Older people for example probably wouldn't get a computer or get e-mailing . . . that's a real generalisation but I'm sure older people will potentially. (Fay, 55) In both these examples, the pessimistic aspect of the internettransformation story is apparent. Such concerns reinforce the idea that something more than technical transition is at stake in these narratives. Beingness and the related notion of security of self and society appear to be important. But as with internet use per se, interviewees were reflexive with this mixture of benefits and drawbacks and shaped their online practices accordingly. In this extract, Leo signaled that the 'You have to come into the world' internet was both cause of, and solution for, challenges in his social life:
Leo: Well I guess I separated from my partner a few years ago, and it's about reestablishing a sense of where you fit in the world and a sense of belonging with other people around you, so you maintain this kind of thread of connection with lots of people who are in your life, and it's kind of reminded you that you're part of a network with other people and you use it for quite practical things like organising social events. I:
Why is it important to be reminded that you're part of a network? Leo: I think it's about mitigating the sense of isolation that you can feel in this society that we're a part of. Because in the urban life you don't often have, it's not like a village environment where you see the same people all the time. Life is very fast, it takes you sometimes months to catch up with people, so it's sort of keeping track of what else is going on in your world. I've had times when I've gone completely off it, because you feel like you're actually relying on it as a form of keeping yourself in the world. (Leo, 43) Leo's account suggested that the internet was seen as a method of sustaining one's social self in a 'world' becoming more difficult to negotiate. Leo recognised that his social isolation flowed from his recent separation and suggested that this experience was both accentuated and addressed by his internet practices. In a manner that recalls the ontological troubles for online selves, his story was one of overcoming the challenges and optimising the possibilities presented in life with the internet. Here, then, there is a recognition that the internet has contributed to these conditions; it is a source of challenge for the self but also a site for retrieval or re-shaping of the self. Hence the internet is cause and effect and both problem and solution.
Ellen's 'you have to come into the world' and Leo's 'keeping yourself in the world' foreground how selves are troubled and, perhaps necessarily, shaped anew. These problems of beingness are subjectifying in a specific way; they are the method by which internet-users make themselves subjects of social transition, of changing worlds, full of trouble and possibility. Such practices mark them as reflexive subjects of the internet age. It is perhaps for this reason that some interviewees talk of their internet-related transitions with the language of emotions -with Ellen moving from anxiety to love -and therefore pursue the retrieval or shaping of a more stable, happy, or at least, resolute sense of 'being-in-the-world' after the internet.
Internet technologies as narrative
'Being-in-the-world' appeared to take on a systematic quality in connection with particular internet technologies. Kate provided a story of using health information websites and interactive fora to source information and advice regarding a health concern. The account was characterised by the way it told a story of how storytelling figures in online exchanges regarding care of the body and mind:
Kate: Like I just had no idea about, I had no [prior] need to have knowledge about skin medicines, treatments. Didn't have any idea. But I was able to use the internet. I found a really good website. Still visit it on occasion. And it was nothing but -it was a skin care forum. Along with information and profiles about the members. So you know, when you've got a member, who's posted a lot, and you can go back and read their posts, and they are a dermatologist, you're like, alright, I think this is credible information. I:
That was useful? Useful information? Kate: And also for emotional support. And I didn't actually start posting on it. I was just ghosting , who were using my medicine, because it causes an initial breakout, 'It's just, oh, it's awful. Oh, it's so hard'. And when I finally got through that, 'I've got my skin back again'. But there'd be like this particular sub-forum that was just for people using this medicine. And you'd read about people who just like, you know they'd be posting, 'God please help -this is awful.' And being able to -I had hours! -being able to compose these lovely, lovely posts back to people. I:
To encourage them and support them? Kate: Yeah. And I actually got feedback from some of those. It was really nice, 'You're the only good thing that's keeping me going'. 'Just keep going, six weeks from now you're going to be so happy'. Yeah, but it's awful while you're going through it . . . . . . It's so visible. And, you know, it doesn't feel like it's your face. It doesn't feel like it's yours'. And yeah, it's really like a sort of isolating thing. (Kate, 32) In this extract, people were depicted as sharing their stories online; communicating about their illness experience and recovery. Emotional and bodily transitions figured here also. Health-related transition was managed with encouragement to persist with treatment regimes. Nettleton et al. have pointed out that emotions associated with the health uses of the internet reflect the emotional aspects of 'You have to come into the world' illness in general, and that some people may use the internet to seek 'reassurance' or, in other terms, confirmation that their approach to care of themselves and others is grounded in sound information and advice (2004). Kate's account reinforces this idea through the exchange of encouragement between users of the website. Kate's story can also be read as an example of what Arthur Frank has called the 'strategic' genre of health narrative, where there is a focus on overcoming the adversity of illness through the action of the self (2006) . Kate figured herself as undertaking just this kind of recovery and sharing this experience with others online. In this, Kate's story is reminiscent of those of Ellen and Leo, who also made recovery, or perhaps restitution, transitions with regard to their sense of beingness after the internet. Kate's story, however, suggests rather strongly that internet technologies and narrative are in co-constitutive relation. Kate's uses of the internet have specific effects for her health care, but they also depend on her biography and especially the circumstances of her health. The internet technologies in play here do not simply exist outside of Kate's quest for improvements in her health, therefore impinging on her biography and deflecting her on a new path in the pursuit of her health care. Nor do they simply offer themselves as tools for the mediation of her health-seeking agency. The internet technologies in play depend on Kate's biographical and corporeal circumstances for the particular form and function they take, but at the same time, such moments in Kate's life depend on internet technologies. Internet technologies understood in this inclusive, ontological sense are in co-constitutive relation with narrative reparation.
Another internet technology that emerged in the interviews as having pronounced narrative qualities was Facebook, the popular social networking site. Mary spoke of how she was required to move onto Facebook to keep in contact with her friends: In Mary's account, Facebook had biographical elements including: birthdays; events; forward planning; looking back over social events; reconnecting with old friends; sustaining connections with current ones. Facebook gains its meaningful social effects through its capacity to record and circulate information about the self and events and to manage social connections. But also, Facebook means nothing without its users shaping their profiles and networks in ways that reflect their own biographies, real and imagined, happened and hoped for. Facebook provides its users with ways of undertaking the imaginative work implied in the social existence becoming possible for them. In this view, Facebook appears as a meaningful technology because of what narrative makes possible, in the manner I have noted in relation to Kate's story of internet technologies and her health care.
We can also recognise that Facebook, as a commercial internet technology, seeks value by asking its users to be selfforming and forward-looking. It can be argued, therefore, that the imaginary of social transformation under internet technologies is put to profitable use in the commercial internet. This is not an uncommon mode of capitalist production. For example, new genetic technologies are put forward as opportunities for forwardlooking consumers (Adams et al., 2009) . Miraculously though, via internet technologies, these possibilities are not simply purchased by internet users. Online citizens, like Mary, perform these operations on themselves. Similar processes of consumerism have been noted in research on e-dating (Arvidsson, 2006) . The internet is not only in co-constitutive relation with the narrative practices of its users, it also sells the self to oneself in a sense, extracting value from the internet-based labour figured around who one wishes to become.
'You have to come into the world'
Discussion
This paper has explored accounts of internet-related life transitions through a diversified narrative approach, exploring transformation stories concerning the internet, subjectivity in connection with accounts of internet-related transitions, and the relation that internet technologies have with narrative practices. This multiple narrative approach was used to make the stories of the internet and social change objects of inquiry in themselves and in the talk of interviewees. Narrative's emphasis on subjectivity and transition was employed to explore how the interviewees addressed themselves to the experience of life after the internet. Kate's story of the therapeutic value of sharing stories and Mary's use of Facebook to sustain her social life were used to draw attention to different ways in which internet technologies and narrative practices can constitute each other. In so doing, I have addressed debates and theory regarding the social aspects of the internet and linked these with the accounts of everyday online life, a form of research on the internet -society relation that is not often undertaken. As the narrative inquiry adopted here shows, technological and cultural determinism, while having some value at times, fail to help us engage with the mutually constitutive quality of the internet -society relation. As Heidegger famously wrote: 'the essence of technology is by no means anything technological ' (1977b: 4) . By implication, internet technologies need to be understood in terms of how they repeatedly and necessarily transcend their own corporeal facticity and toolish effects. The expanded narrative inquiry adopted here goes some way to engagement with the fullness and nuance of being-in-the-world with internet technologies.
The language of emotional transition was a feature of the accounts of life with the internet, for example, Ellen's shift from 'distress' to 'love', Leo's recognition that the internet was both problem and solution for his post-separation life, and Kate's account of using the internet in her efforts to heal herself and helping others to do so. These examples all suggest a reparative pattern to accounts of life with some internet technologies. It was also noted that use of the language of emotional transition and the reparation it implies is prefigured by the 'internet transformation' story, which mobilises the affective cues of pessimism and hope. And such emotionally figured transition is, it seems, not easy to resist. Ellen's imperative and performative 'you have to come into the world', Leo's 'keeping yourself in the world' and, to some extent, Mary's account of having to use Facebook to sustain her social life, draw attention to the requirements on subjects implied in life with the internet. Emotional transition understood as reparative is, then, also a means for adapting to the imperatives, perhaps even constraints, of internet-based existence.
These and other engagements with 'world' also signaled questions of beingness for selves and social interaction in online existence. Selves were understood as open to change because of, and through, the internet, either because one had to make such changes, as Ellen suggested, or as a matter of strategic action on health concerns, as Kate indicated. Such ambiguity with regard to one's ontological status is not restricted to the internet, but it has been shown here that internet technologies do engage a variously troubled and/or hopeful, forwardlooking self. Indeed, the commercial internet seems to exploit this feature of internet technologies by offering itself as the means by which internet users can solve life's problems. As was discussed, narrative practice articulated through internet technologies was one way in which the self was both problematised and the basis by which selves went about the quest for a renewed or restored sense of beingness.
The diversified narrative approach applied here has addressed some persisting challenges regarding how we conceptualise the internet technologies -social change relation. Internet-users are not only subject to the stories of the impact of internet technologies on society; nor do they simply take up such technologies to effect storytelling. Some, perhaps many, internet-technologies owe their beingness to narrative. Following Haraway, '. . . it is not clear who makes and who is made ' (1991: 178) in the relation between internet technologies and narrative. Selves and the internet technologies they employ share a mutually-afforded being. It is suggested then that internet-related life transitions are ways -perhaps now central -in which selves can make themselves subject to, and resolve themselves to, social change. This perspective helps explain why the internet transformation story, expressed in terms of pessimism and/or hope, continues to have such traction. Internet technologies are indeed sites for the exercise of our concerns and aspirations regarding who we might become.
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